Editorial
Technology Research in Mine Action:
Enough is Enough
by Russell Gasser
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wenty years ago I started work on a doc-

funding. Field practitioners in humanitarian demining want-

torate thesis asking the question: “Why

ed better tools and equipment as soon as possible and at af-

has research into new technologies for

fordable prices. Researchers offered to help but didn’t manage

mine action had so little success?” My research

to communicate that academic and industrial research is ex-

discovered that about one billion dollars had

pensive and usually several years away from yielding finished

been spent by the year 2000 on fundamental and

products. Too many researchers did not understand why de-

applied research to produce new technologies

miners were so reluctant to test unproven equipment in live

to solve the mine problem. The resulting ben-

minefields. Too often both sides felt let down by each other.
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efit for humanitarian mine action was indeed

What researchers produce is usually several steps away

very small. Since then, large-scale spending has

from being usable in the field. Research results need to be

continued with limited success. Researchers and

turned into realistic prototypes that can be tested, which is

their funders have not learned from continued,

the first step. Prototype tests then lead to a production de-

expensive failure. There is clear cause and effect

sign, and finally a production version that is first tested in

at work, which means that many research proj-

simulation and then certified in live areas. However, this does

ects and programs have followed a similar route

not automatically mean the technology is going to be cost-

to failure.

effective or worth using, and each one of these development

New technology has an important role in
making mine action faster, safer, cheaper, or

Researchers and their funders were highly motivated by

some useful combination of these three. Major

what they saw as a moral obligation to focus their efforts on

gains to safety and/or productivity have result-

this humanitarian task. There was apparently a widespread

ed from the use of satellite and cell phones, GPS,

assumption that there was no available means of clearing

digital cameras, laptops and tablet computers,

mines and that any advance—no matter how complex or

map plotters, Google Earth mapping, polycar-

costly—would be a step forward. In fact, manual demining

bonate for visors and Kevlar for protective vests

methods were already well developed by the late 1980s. When

and much more. However, none of these gains

properly managed, manual clearance was safe and reasonably

came from research into new technologies for

cost-effective. My investigations showed that as much as 80

mine action, they all came from adapting and ap-

percent of the demining research aimed to improve the de-

plying useful, off-the-shelf products. These prod-

tection of buried mines, usually minimum metal mines, and

ucts could afford the high cost of research and

ignored the majority of other urgent problems that field man-

development as they had a large-scale market.

agers face. In the 1990s, a minority of researchers began to

Mutual

misunderstanding

between

re-

analyze the problem. The Development Technology Unit of

searchers and demining organizations began in

the University of Warwick in the United Kingdom, where I

the early 1990s when research into mine action

was working, observed deminers in Cambodia from a safe

technology started receiving large amounts of

distance. We discovered that they spent up to 70 percent of
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steps can cost more than the original research.
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their time cutting vegetation. Clearly, the vegetation clear-

mine as the top priority. There is also the feeling of “just one

ance problem was urgent and led to the Tempest mini-flail,

more breakthrough and we will be there.” Both of these tend

locally produced in Phnom Penh.2

to overrule rational analysis. This is not a research issue; fund-

In terms of reducing the cost and time of returning land to

raising also relies on the public response to the horror of AP

productive use, area reduction (defining the boundaries of the

mines. Unexploded ordnance kills and injures more peo-

area that has to be cleared) and the resulting release of land

ple than AP mines, and unplanned explosions of munition

without clearance is probably the single most important is-

stockpiles kill even more. However, the research proposals

sue. Although the topic was mentioned at conferences, only a

that seek to improve AP mine detection often focus on rela-

few mine action field practitioners flagged this as an issue and

tively uncommon minimum metal mines.

researchers did not pick up the topic.
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Expensive research projects continued to produce marginal gains in mine detection by developing equipment suitable
for use on flat ground without vegetation. In terms of pure research, this is the obvious path: start with the theory, develop
the techniques, and gradually apply them to real world scenarios by developing prototypes to test. But this was not what
the mine action world wanted. In 2016, as many countries approach the end of proactive mine clearance and are moving to
management of residual contamination (MRC), the need for
long-term research is becoming even harder to justify.
In the 1990s, there was a tango that went around and
around but led nowhere. At meetings, researchers would ask
“What are the key problems that we should be working on?”
and field staff would reply, “What are the main areas where
you can make a difference?” I remember one well-intentioned
project where the researchers gave the mine action staff a long
list of issues that the research could address and asked for prioritization. The response was that all the problems were “very
important.” Thus, no progress was made as no priorities were
identified. Priorities cannot be determined by emotional appeal but instead need analysis and tough decisions. Even less
common were cost-benefit analyses.
At times, the degree of separation between the research
lab and the field led to multiple failures. One research project co-funded by the European Commission discovered that
their lab equipment overheated and failed during field trials
in Africa. Did their field partner not inform them about the
hot weather because it seemed too obvious? Without a prior survey, the manufacturer of a large, mine clearance machine complained that Cambodia had the “wrong type of
minefields” despite spending large amounts of donor money
to have the machine transported.
Six Primary Reasons Why Mine Action
Technology Research Has Yielded Few Results

1.

2.

While researchers wanted to improve knowl-

edge and its application, field practitioners usually thought
the purpose of donor funding was to provide better tools
and equipment in the short to medium term. Too much research focused on generating solutions to problems that were
not clearly identified. In one case, a project that cost several million Euros of public money showed that the probability of detecting mines was reduced when the project’s “data
fusion” method was applied. In the project’s final evaluation, a university professor declared that the project was
a useful contribution in that it showed what did not work,
which was true but did not immediately benefit deminers.
  Whereas many researchers and donors want to focus
on breakthrough technologies, demining needs incremental improvements to well-established methods and technologies. Dismissing incremental improvements because they are
somehow less important is a serious error. Metal detectors are
an example of a successful, incremental improvement; performance now is far better than it was 20 years ago; sensitivity,
background compensation, size, weight and battery life have
all significantly improved by manufacturers. Advanced and
automatic data fusion methods for multi-sensor detection received millions of research money to seek a breakthrough but
made little or no impact in the field.

3.

There has been a widespread failure to understand the

economics of humanitarian demining. There are two parts to
this misunderstanding: the first involves the overall economic purpose of mine action whereas the second concerns the
cost of going from lab research to a finished, usable product.
   There may be no overall benefit from a modest reduction
in clearance costs if the money is diverted away from the local
economy in the mine-affected country and instead supports
high-tech research in first-world countries. The purpose
of mine action is to save lives, reduce injuries and help reestablish livelihoods postwar. Employing hundreds, or even

There is a deep-seated psychological need to address

thousands, of deminers is an effective way to stimulate the

the horror of stepping on an unseen, anti-personnel (AP)

local economy. The effect multiplies and boosts recovery
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“Metal detectors are an example of a successful,
incremental improvement...”
efforts as money recirculates around the community, and

to have advanced university degrees. Non-specialist do-

local people start small businesses. If the objective of mine

nors had no understanding of the enormous gap between

action is to rebuild war-torn economies and help local peo-

the pool of available subject experts to decide on research

ple, diverting resources to a rich country to pay for advanced

proposals and the field practitioners who wanted better

technology in order to get a small gain on price per square

tools and equipment for immediate use in far-off lands.

meter makes no sense at all. Achieving the overall purpose

   Another effect of the dominance of military demining

of mine action is what matters; cost per square meter is only

experience 20 years ago was large-scale funding for research

one part of this. Some new technology proposals have even

projects focused on well-established military demining tasks.

threatened to drive up the cost of clearance. One such project

Some of these had little or no application to humanitarian de-

received millions of Euros of public money and was based on

mining. There was no intention that humanitarian funding

detecting explosive using neutrons. The neutron generator

should be used for military research, but at times that is what

required was very expensive, had a short life span and was so

happened for some high-cost technologies later used for mili-

powerful it required registration by the user to comply with

tary purposes but not for humanitarian demining.

the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in force at the time.
  The second economic issue is the gap caused
by the amount of time and money that successful laboratory research needs to yield a certified
product for the field. Transition is difficult, slow and expensive, and usually costs more than the original research.
  The market for improved mine action technologies is
small and insufficient for expensive commercial development. While I was project officer for new technologies at the
European Commission in the early 2000s, many research
funding proposals overestimated the potential sales of a future product and underestimated the cost of product development. A few projects predicted that the annual sales of
their product would be worth more than the best estimate
we had for the global budget for all humanitarian demining
equipment worldwide.

4.

Risk management has unexpected side effects. Most

donors are not specialists and know little about mine action
technology. To manage risk, they seek subject experts, who
can make decisions on which projects to fund and how to
evaluate progress. For some public sector donors, the use
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5.

A number of high-profile research projects, of-

ten supported by internationally well-known people, have
gained public support and leveraged large-scale funding.
The projects proposed were often expensive and unfeasible
(e.g., reliable, airborne detection of individual buried mines
through vegetation; rolling heavy objects over uneven terrain in a random way without recording exactly where they
passed), or were so expensive as to be entirely impractical
for humanitarian purposes even if the technology worked.
The publicity only mentioned the potential benefits, not the
costs: “we have a responsibility to get these mines out of the
ground and make the land safe for people to live a normal
life without fear.”4 These projects not only wasted money but
created a false public perception of demining and the role of
mine action technology, and marginalized the demining organizations that they claimed to help. Moreover, they ignore
the current solution: the properly trained and equipped human deminer.

6.

Mine action practitioners have not always shown

interest in the best research ideas and, at times have in-

of these independent experts is a requirement. Available

discriminately treated all research as equally lacking in

experts 20 years ago were usually academics with deep

value. For example, in 1999, a student research team dis-

knowledge of the technology proposed or one of a group of

covered that oval, cross-section prodders (a cheap and sim-

recognized international mine action consultants who of-

ple tool) significantly reduced the force needed to prod

ten had limited experience with military demining. It was

into hard soil compared to normal, round-section prod-

difficult to recruit active field staff who comprehensively

ders. Accidentally detonating mines while prodding in

understood humanitarian mine action at the ground level;

hard soil is a known source of accidents, so this simple,

evaluating research proposals was widely viewed as a com-

research-based advancement in technology could be ex-

plete waste of time for field staff. The situation was exacer-

pected to be widely used and well-publicized in the mine ac-

bated by the requirement of some agencies for consultants

tion community. The risk to deminers could be reduced by
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specifying oval prodders in operating procedures, contracts

Mine Action Centre (CROMAC), United Nations Mine Action

and mine action standards. However, the idea has not been

Service (UNMAS) and the Geneva International Centre for

widely embraced or shared. Is this the result of a “not in-

Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) organize mine action

vented here” attitude, or just poor communication of ideas?

technology conferences, but at the last UNMAS/GICHD con-

Conclusion
As mine action in many countries moves from proactive
clearance to reactive MRC, there is a real opportunity to improve the take-up and cost effectiveness of new technology.
MRC is a well understood process with a long history of success, especially in northern Europe. There is already a wide
range of commercial equipment, from simple hand tools to
hi-tech systems, that is in daily use in countries still clearing explosive remnants from the two World Wars. There is no
significant technology gap that prevents effective MRC from
working in Europe.
Adapting existing techniques and solutions for use in
new climates and areas without the supporting infrastructure found in Europe will naturally require some resources.
However, we cannot possibly justify repetitive research and
development in an effort to reinvent the wheel.
For proactive clearance, there are a lot of adaptive and in-

ference, out of more than 70 participants, fewer than 10 were
national staff from mine affected countries. How can we encourage more people who will select the technologies needed
for their country and approve equipment budgets to attend?
Why is this not already a priority?
Mine action could learn from other areas where a community of practice has been established to support this type of technology transfer. Building a community of practice is not an easy
task but would ensure that mine action technology moves forward in terms of cost effectiveness and deminer safety.
In addition, donors who are interested in funding mine action technology research would benefit from learning about
the realities of technical needs, the low probability of getting
past the research stage to a production prototype, and the
need for cost-benefit and technical appraisal.
Perhaps the most important question to ask is why millions of dollars is available for research into technology that
is unlikely to succeed whereas funding to develop and share

genious solutions that have already been developed under

solutions based on existing technology is sparse. This is the

field conditions or through appropriate research such as the

core question that needs to be answered if we are to learn from

oval-section prodders mentioned above, or the use of rakes.

experience.

Many of these solutions are known only locally because they

It’s time to end the current situation where huge expendi-

have not been published or shared. Busy field staff rarely have

tures have achieved so little, and technology research contin-

spare time, extra money or interest in the amount of work re-

ues to deliver poor value for money.

quired to publish an article or attend a conference. An equip-

See endnotes page 66

ment catalogue that is more than a manufacturer’s sales sheet
is needed. Collecting and sharing information about inventive
solutions to regional problems (as well as broader problems)

The author wishes to thank Bob Keeley for his comments on
the draft.

is both urgently needed and far more cost and time effective
than high-technology research. An online catalogue that includes photos, videos, interviews and information about actual results, including costs and benefits, would be a valuable
resource. Translation is an essential requirement for accessibility, while constant maintenance and updating is necessary.
After the information is collected, it should be made
available to people who can use it. This goes far beyond providing a website or a printed document, even beyond more
accessible technology such as apps for smartphones and tablets. Sharing information must be an active process to identify, contact, interest and earn the trust of people who could
benefit from the information. This is perhaps where research
is needed. How do we get field managers, especially national
staff, to take an interest in and put aside time to learn about
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technologies that could benefit their programs? The Croatian
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